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10-1-98 Vtec

Caption: 
In Re Appeal of: Jeff Sullivan

Appellant's attorney's letter stating that appellant "wishes to withdraw his application" did not unilaterally "negate" the ZBA's issuance of the permit, but the letter was effective as an application to the ZBA to vacate the permit. If appellant wishes to withdraw an application for a permit that has issued, the appellant must apply to the ZBA to withdraw the application and vacate the permit or appellant could have appealed the permit conditions to the court. A landowner who holds an issued permit need not construct what he or she has applied to construct. Because the zoning regulations automatically void a permit that has not been acted on within the year, appellant's permit expired by operation of law and appellant is entitled to continue the uses allowed under the prior permit. Town zoning regulations automatically void a permit that has not been acted on within the year. Because appellant did not act on the permit, it is no longer in effect and appellant is entitled to continue the uses allowed by his prior permit. Because a hearing on the request to withdraw was never held, the “deemed approval” statutes were not triggered. Nothing in 24 VSA §§ 4444, 4445 or 4470(c) authorizes injunctive relief or prospective penalties for violations that have not yet occurred and that may never occur. A new notice of violation is a prerequisite to any enforcement action under § 4444. Towing of vehicles needing repair and towing of vehicles on emergency basis is an accessory use to an automobile repair business. Thus, if appellant’s addition of towing to business had been offered only within hours of operation approved in permit, no amendment would have been required. Court cannot find from evidence that appellant’s business is similarly situated to other businesses, which appellant showed were not subjected to same conditions or enforcement efforts, under the parameters of zoning district, permit status or pre-existing status. Even if Court concluded that appellant was selectively treated, court cannot find from evidence that it was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, malice, bad faith or appellant’s exercise of constitutional right to free speech. Court clarified paragraph 3 of Order upon request because parties differed as to its interpretation.

Date: 
4/12/1999